or: Better Living Through Philosophy
twitter:@ult_phil
"The highest responsibility of philosophers is to serve as the guardians and integrators of human knowledge." -Ayn Rand
"Better to be a sage satisfied than anything else?" -UP
Showing posts with label aristotelianism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label aristotelianism. Show all posts
Friday, February 28, 2020
A libertarian social safety net
For reasons the merits of which are not altogether clear to me, a great many people have been habituated into the thought that a social-welfare safety net has to be administered, coercively (at the point of a gun), by the state. We're not even talking here about emergency measures that perhaps only a state-scale entity could take during a deep recession or depression, or during a deadly virus outbreak (there's one I have readily in mind at this very moment), but rather an ongoing, cradle-to-grave, offensive-to-liberty, welfare state.
Consider: the United States had, by today's standards, a very small federal government, outside of wartime, for the first century-plus of its existence. Somehow the people managed to get by without all of today's largesse; somehow it managed to develop into a world power with a per-capita GDP growth rate not unlike what came after. As for what has come since, non-military spending at all levels of government (federal, state, local) has steadily increased to over 30 percent of GDP today, even as GDP has expanded many-fold during that time.
On its face, this indicates that it's not some pressing, life-or-death need that feeds the welfare-state mentality, but rather a mentality reflecting a contempt for principles of liberty (to adopt a phrase used in the title of a Walter Williams book).
(As for pressing, life-or-death needs, there will be, for the foreseeable future given foreseeable technological and production frontiers, such pressing needs at the margins. Even the "successful" (using a specifically statism-inflected moral standard) Nordic-style welfare states still have nonzero poverty rates, e.g., around 5% in "Denmawk!" And the economically-advanced nations continue to hoard wealth out of the reach of the desperately needy peoples of Africa and elsewhere; part of the prevailing welfare-state mentality is that "universal healthcare as a matter of human rights" doesn't extend to such geographically less lucky peoples. That is, the pressing-needs-at-the-margins argument that is the wedge in the door welfare-statists use to get us to the 30-percent-of-GDP level we have today, is selectively not expanded to cover the entire world. The expenses would then supposedly be too unreasonably demanding of the wealth-producers' talents, energies, time, and lives, see - that is, the global top x% selfishly lives high while letting others die. As for a sustainable, i.e., capital-intensive route to economic development for the geographically unlucky people, transfers of already-produced wealth from altruistic first-worlders, to thereby be consumed by the unlucky ones, won't cut it, however warm and fuzzy it makes the altruistic ones feel. Only in the era of globalized capitalism has the global poverty rate been declining (dramatically).)
Human beings flourish as members of communities. That's a point well-recognized by sages like Aristotle. But it's a category error to lump "community" in with "state" or government. A sine qua non of state institutions is physical force, i.e., compulsion or threat at the point of a gun. Under the classic libertarian analysis, physical force must not be initiated or introduced into human affairs; its only proper use is to repel or redress initiated force. ("But what about x, y, z, this that and the other thing, be it public goods, public health emergencies, depressions, etc.?" Is it really that such pressing needs and concerns can't be addressed by non-state means, or is there a failure of imagination involved? And is even a hardcore libertarian analysis not amenable in any way to libertarian interpretations of the invasiveness to human autonomy that is a public health threat? Are we even really sure that economic depressions come from the operations of a fully free market under fair legal constraints? Are the likes of David Friedman just out to lunch?)
Now, my vision for an ideal social order is something like this: Aristotelian-eudaimonist-perfectionist ethical norms, under some wide or universal recognition of the idea of better living through philosophy (including philosophy for children), combined with libertarian social-political norms. (Are there such things as incorporated cities even in an 'anarcho-capitalist' framework envisioned by Friedman et al? There are incorporated other things, so I don't see why not. So there may be cities, but perhaps not city-states - presumably the form of polity of primary focus for an ancient Greek philosopher - cities being localized and more under direct control of the territorial participants. So, would such cities have the (delegated) rights to regulate the size of soft drink you can purchase within the city limits? More on that in just a moment.) Under such a social framework, based on eudaimonist or flourishing norms alone, there would be a large private-sector-based social safety net, probably operating under the virtue-based norm of aid that Rand/Galt promulgated in Atlas Shrugged (and which Rand-bashers refuse to acknowledge, having lazily/recklessly caricatured her egoism in base, non-virtue-based terms).
So let's say I am posed the question, "If you could eliminate the ongoing cradle-to-grave welfare state right now, given all its offenses to human liberty, would you advocate for that?" But under scrutiny, the terms of the question are a moot point. Hypotheticals or counterfactuals should be treated with all the seriousness they deserve, which is to say, they need to consider not merely the consequent but the preconditions for the antecedent. (That is to say, hypotheticals or counterfactuals are open to abuse in the absence of proper context-keeping.) That is to say, there is no conceivable scenario, under proper constraints for conceiving things, in which the welfare state is going to be eliminated right now. (Properly constrained conceiving - as distinct from, say, imagining - doesn't permit conceiving of pigs who can fly unaided, hence the saying. No proper concept of "pig" allows for it; it would drop the context of how we came to form and maintain the concept.) The prevailing norms of American society won't allow for it. The people would have to be converted to the Aristotelian-etc. principles I note and link to above, or be moved considerably in such a direction, or some such widespread values-alteration.
Would cities or other territorial communities make laws or regulations about soft drink sizes, or sexual practices, or other matters of virtue? Or is there something about the libertarian norm that reflects and informs how people ought to treat one another generally speaking? Or more exactly, is it something about what explains, grounds, or informs the libertarian norm (linking again) that involves a perhaps-judgmental yet laissez-faire attitude toward how people conduct their lives? I mean, let's say that rather than paternistically regulating soft drink purchases, people apply Rand/Galt's virtue-based approach and condition social aid on either past virtuous behavior or on education for future virtuous behavior? I think that this eudaimonist-libertarian way of thinking, actually present but largely implicit or inchoate in a great number of American people, helps explain what they find so offensive about Mayor Bloomberg's paternalism (which flows over into the mentality behind his highly intrusive "stop-and-frisk" policies, a mentality I don't see being extricated from his worldview all that soon, the same as with the elitist hubris behind his comments about farming skills). Anyway, eudaimonist-libertarian social norms would emphasize education toward people exercising their best judgment, and then leaving it up to them to exercise their judgment given their own context of knowledge and hierarchy of values. Like, duh?
To sum up: Like perhaps quite a lot of libertarians, I'm all for a robust social-welfare safety net and other virtues of sociality and community, just not at the point of a gun. And with enough imagination (fueled by an intellectual perfectionism and/or the kind or quality of thinking behind Nozick's appallingly neglected framework for utopia) as well as ample benevolence, wouldn't it be a better safety net than the one currently existing?
[Addendum: Under a broadly prevailing culture of Aristotelian intellectual perfectionism, would there be even nearly as much need for social safety net institutions, or would people be a lot more self-sufficient in that regard? I urge much properly-constrained imaginative conceiving in this regard. Much like Rand, and contrary to the usual lazy caricatures of her, I have a very high view of human potentialities even as regards the less talented; while I don't envision a repeal of the bell curve, I envision a marked 'rightward' shifting of it under culturally Aristotelian conditions.]
Tuesday, January 14, 2020
More in re: Huemer: "Please don't be Aristotelian"
"When and how would Aristotle - or more specifically, an Aristotelian - exercise the virtue of sardonic wit?" (asks UP) "When it's all in fitting proportion and harmony, at the right time, in the right place, in the right measure, a phronemos will tend to figure it out over time. Like, duh. (If that means smoking a bowl to get warmed up, then so be it.)" (answers UP)
If there's one thing I learned in philosophy fight club, it's that those who go in against a Sicilian when death is on the line - er, uh, Aristoteles of Stagira, top student of Platon and tutor to Alexander the Great, founder of such systematic disciplines as dialectic, propositional logic, biology, psychology (let's just say De Anima, which I will get to in just a moment), whose theories took some nearly 2000 years for other thinkers to supersede, etc. etc. and whose most lasting and greatest contribution to philosophy as done today is found in the all-important area of ethics, perhaps along with the topic I'll cover next - those who dare denigrate this man as a philosopher have their work cut out for them to say the least. He keeps getting misrepresented (and like an axiom accepted in the process, etc., as Rand points out) and each time he keeps getting back up. Compare the shoddy treatment of Aristotle by a Bertrand Russell vs. the clue-having approach of a Christopher Shields & Co. at the Stanford Encyclopedia, just to get a small sampling of the oft-recurring picture here.
How would one be able to spot a first-rate metaphilosopher, BTW? I have only semi-developed ideas toward systematic and reliable criteria in this regard. Note that I begin with "dialectic" above, which (presented in a less famous book of writings known as the Topics) is philosophically fundamental to Aristotle's method of approach to any number of life's biggest questions, which yielded great (sprawlingly learned) results then and which I believe can be of timeless and lasting usefulness for human thinkers and actors. ("Be cognitively and practically perfectionistic ffs.")
So, I'd like to apply Aristotelian method as exemplified in De Anima to contemporary pseudo-disputes in philosophy of mind - specifically, the "question" of whether some kind of substance dualism is necessary to understand the mind-body relation. (A dialectic approach is by its very nature reactive against dualisms where they are posited....) On the some-kind-of-dualist side (in the present day, not to mention the most famous and infludential mind-body dualist, Descartes) is David Chalmers, on the some-kind-of-Aristotelian/hylemorphist side is Daniel Dennett, noted atheist (doesn't believe in that supernatural tri-omni God, that's for sure) and (buzzword alert) philosophical naturalist (who might be thereby easily caricatured as a practitioner of scientism, for which see the not-unrelated Rapoport/Dennett Rules [bad news for leftists: advantage Rand & libertarianism]).
Now, Aristotelian-style hylemorphism - coming from the Greek roots for "matter" and "form" - says in basic essence that the soul is the form or organizing principle of a material body (and which in its most mature or developed or perfected activity or energeia - this also seems indispensable to what's Aristotelian proper - also serves as the final cause or telos or (in the case of humans) eudaemonic destiny of the organism). And the point when it comes to philosophy of mind is that the soul or organizing principle ('mind' in the case of humans; 'sentience' in mentally less complex forms of consciousness) is inseparable from the body, both in the metaphysical sense (of things like dependence of one substance or substrate upon another), and in the conceptual sense (i.e., we can't coherently and sensibly conceive of the body-processes and soul-processes going on apart from one another, because their very nature as matter-principle and form-principle, and their functional and/or teleological explanations are inseparable from one another, and perhaps some other considerations).
My sardonic suggestion is this: dualism as represented by Descartes is a metaphysically inferior and magical-thinking-involving, and Aristotelian-style hylemorphism is not only the superior position but is just plain more commonsensical. I mean, for fuck's sake already.
Now, there's this phrase sometimes or often thrown about in philosophy of mind discussions: "neural correlates of consciousness." Now, everyone considerably learned has heard about the phrase "correlation doesn't imply causation." So "neural correlates of consciousness" are not to be taken to mean neural causes of consciousness. We wouldn't want to bias our terminology/framing illictly on behalf of a monocausal-dependency-relationship position (complicated by free will, which is a distinct but not unrelated issue), now, do we? But what, then, does "neural correlates..." do in framing terms if not to indicate that it's a mere correlation or some 1:1 correspondence at best but we would be too quick in our framing to attribute any form of causation to this relationship (and which is perhaps merely put together in thought by habit of association, as Hume might put it)?
So "neural correlates" doesn't help us when some better alternative - let's just pull it out of my ass and call it "neural substrates of consciousness," say - is available to us, now, does it. And what reason is there not to go with the commonsense understanding that what we have here is consciousness and its neural substrate (which is inseparable from what the hoi polloi might call a central nervous system [ffs already, do the folk really have more wisdom on this topic than the academic hairsplitters and would that be surprising?]).
So it wasn't until modern technology of scientific discovery that we find out in detail about these neural . . . this neural substrate of conscious states whereas before in the history of thought - not within the Aristotelian tradition, mind you, but in traditions of thought where true metaphysically real magic is believed to occur or explain the observed - it was not understood "how" the body would be the one and only container of the soul or mind. (This "how" might be a simplified version of the famous so-called hard problem of consciousness as Chalmers formulates/frames it.) But Aristotelian hylemorphism explains how in principle this (mutual?-)dependency relationship (body/matter and soul/form) is not only possible but inescapably necessary. We just need to get careful in how we formulate mental or subject-perspective or first-person predicates on the one hand, as distinct from (but not altogether dualistically opposed to) how we formulate physical or third-person predicates on the other.
But here is how the first-person and third-person perspectives are inseparably linked in the hylemorphic framework: The MRI machine (say) locates some kind of activity in some portion of the brain and this is (causally) associated with the person's inner mental experience which only that person has direct or any other sort of full access to. (Empathic pain at another's pain is very much associated with the others' first-person pain-access, but it's a different sort of unwanted mental state, what we might usually say is emotional pain rather than physical pain or bad-sensation.) This is a commonsense distinction (what I experience on the one hand; what data the MRI picks up on the other), but it doesn't lend any support that I can see to a dualistic framing. First-person experience is distinct from third-person observation or explanation, is all.
And it seems to me like Descartes, in his otherwise admirably independent-minded zeal to free his thought from scholastic-ish dogmas of a petrified 'Aristotelianism,' ditched the hylemorphic and biologically-based teleology baby along with the cosmic-teleology bathwater, and in the process came up with what must ultimately be deemed a shitty philosophy of mind (with magical thinking about the pineal gland as putative 'locus' of the [coincidental? incidental? occasional? parallel? wtf?] 'interaction' being the icing on the cake).
(On TV now, News channel headline: "Warren accuses Sanders of Sexism." Really? That's what gets the mass interest? Genuinely fascinating... (Also, does Demo-rat Rep. Hakeem Jeffries not see how he's in self-parody mode whenever he uses the phrase "1600 Pennsylvania Avenue," like in his latest, "Putin wants to artificially install his buddy Trump once again at 1600...". This in addition to stuff like "Grand Wizard of 1600...". The guy's a clown.))
Prof. Huemer likes common sense, he presumably prefers sophisticated explanations for common sense positions should tend to be preferred over the alternatives, we see how sophisticated treatments of the mind/body distinction (ugh) can run afoul of common sense, we can see how Cartesian or other dualism has fundamentally bad or misleading framing of the "problem" whereas Aristotelianism offers a compelling a dialectically-complete solution to the problem (read: compelling explanatory understanding of the phenomena taking systematically into account all the contributing and entailed phenomena), and yet Huemer chides those of us who identify (in serious and fundamental and quite-well-supported ways) as Aristotelian? (If it's the term "Aristotelian" that's problematic, then: where would an intellectually-perfectionistic/dialectically-complete approach to philosophy of mind lead if not hylemorphism? Alternatively: how does a non-caricatured (i.e., not eliminative-materialist but rather substrate-reductionist) Dennett not basically have the last word on the "problem"?)
[Addendum: just to make sure that the pro-hylemorphism point is sufficiently battered home: We might hear a dualist say something to the effect of, Well, the component or constituent parts of an organism don't have mental experiences. The nerve fibers being impinged aren't the subjects of the pain; the organism is. So that's why we are left to wonder how it is that at organism-scale all these non-conscious components end up giving rise to something conscious? A parallel question arises with respect to free will: how can an organism composed of mechanically-determined components end up, at organism scale, having free will or self-direction capability? And yet in both cases the Aristotelian seems to have the answer - that the person raising the question has already given the answer! IOW: When we speak about what happens at organism-scale, we're already contextualizing what it is that's going on with the component parts such that we can't simply treat the nerve fibers being impinged upon in isolation from the explanatory framework (something something survival value and then also observations about the most mature or developed condition/activity of the organism [self-actualization in the case of humans, etc.]). In this explanatory framework, the nerve fibers being impinged upon just is the efficient cause - the causing event - of the organism's pain-sensation. One might say from the third-person explanatory standpoint that it just is the (locus of) the organism's pain-sensation (whether or not the organism is ever aware of the causal explanation). (Hint: an Aristotelian might bring up distinctions in explanation or causal account as appropriate/fitting for the subject matter., without ruling out multiple accounts applicable to the same phenomena - hence, for example, why he says there are characteristically four distinct causes at work in nature, all interdependent but all contributing something irreducibly distinct and transferable across multiple phenomena. (The wood constituted by wood molecules serves as a material principle or cause, a formal cause at the level of the wood's principle of organization, and this wood can be put to use either in a boat or in a house - a transferability characteristic. The principle involved in nervous system tissue appearing across numerous instantiated organisms even though nervous system tissue is by no means easily transferable with present technology, is another example of the fourfold-causal principles at work at and what levels of explanation.)]
[Addendum #2: This is another can of worms, but Huemer basically says "Please don't be an Objectivist (Ayn Rand devotee)." His interpretation of the content of Randian egoism varies quite a lot from mine (vetted by that Rand-and-dialectics guy at the head of that now-university-published Rand journal). (The "hypothetical Objectivist" he describes is nothing like the actual friends-of-friends-of-Peikoff I had the great pleasure of real-time interacting with in person this past year; nothing noble-soul- or benevolent-sense-of-life-like about disintegrating a homeless person who adds two seconds to one's commute time. Like, duh.) I guess it's these sorts of variations in interpretations that can at least sometimes be philosophically interesting or instructive (as in: better application of Dennett/Rapoport Rules, please; too much failure at this throughout the history of philosophy and thought generally), which is why 'History of Philosophy' can remain a lively field. Shouldn't we at least be up to snuff as to what/how a (representative figure like a) Christopher Shields understands as being 'authentically Aristotelian', if one isn't particularly interested in spending the bulk of one's scholarly time combing the history-of-philosophy scholarly literature? (In the case of Rand/Objectivism, the leading scholarly authority around today would be Peikoff, so it helps to have a clue about this guy's input on what's what in Objectivism if one is to issue forth any sort of authoritative-sounding opinions about Rand/Objectivism. This is by Ayn Rand's own public attestations in 1976 (Ayn Rand Letter) and 1980 (open letter of recommendation appearing in 1997's Letters of Ayn Rand) about Peikoff's expertise in her philosophic thought, no less.)]
Huemer vs. history of philosophy
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| three philosophers |
Re Prof. Huemer's attack on "the history of philosophy" (as he describes it therein; 'Against History') and in particular his (grounds for) saying, "Please don't be an Aristotelian."
As per the previous post I'm transferring over from what is addendum/digression there to main body here:
===
Obviously he's not aware, for instance, of state of the art interpretations from the likes of David Charles and Allen Gotthelf that a final cause or telos is irreducible to the other causes and associated with this idea is that the final cause achieves a good (so we're in normative/value-theory territory, not the realm of mechanics, physics, chemistry, or unevaluative(?) biology). And more generally, from the standpoint of a perfectionistic methodology: if we learn nothing else from the history of philosophy, and if we're good learners, we glean from the study of the past greats just what about their thinking styles made them first-rate thinkers with such lasting influence (such as Aristotle has in ethics, specifically with the recently-revived virtue-ethical tradition - duh).
And if we're really perfectionistic we should be able to devise methods by which to reliably and accurately rank-order the great thinkers on a scale of greatness (be it in cardinal or ordinal terms). By any good measurement system Aristotle comes out pretty much well ahead of the competition in virtue of a monumental body of writings (and lost dialogues likened by some of the ancient wisdom-lovers to rivers of gold to Plato's silver).
(By virtue of her identification of the principle of ordinal rankings in terms of teleological measurement, as well as the identifications made throughout the rest of the Ayn Rand Lexicon, does(n't) Rand rank pretty high on the scale of overall philosophical greatness? By parity of reasoning, if indeed Rand along with the other giants of the history of philosophy - all by repute and nearly all in fact first-rate minds - each had their own well-edited and cross-referenced Lexicon demonstrating with great effectiveness what first-rate minds they pretty much all are, wouldn't that increase people's interest in doing philosophy? Huemer seems to short-change this possibility or something, in which case I suggest he get more dialectical/thorough in reasoning through what value things like history of philosophy provide.)
Also, I've explained in my book (namely in the most-important second chapter, 'Aristotelianism') that I'm an Aristotelian in terms of a tradition of thought defined by certain fundamentals but not beholden to all of Aristotle's arguments (as he himself would have wanted it, duh). And fundamental to his very-impressive-results-getting intellectual enterprise was his philosophic method, which the scholar writing about Aristotle in the Oxford Handbook identifies with dialectic.
But the dialectical method should be treated most fundamentally, not merely as a matter of consulting, giving a fair hearing to, etc., the varied learned and reasoned-sounding opinions, weighing them and deciding on a best explanation; it is most fundamentally the art of context-keeping, for which Huemer can consult Sciabarra's Total Freedom, where Aristotle is treated as the fountainhead of this methodological tradition while its being formulated in terms of Sciabarra's art-of-context-keeping fundamentals (and in terms of the proper application of "both-and" reasoning to competing and partial claims to the truth, in addition to the proper "either-or" reasoning involved). So far as I know, no one's presented any good reason to doubt Sciabarra's thesis, not even the ultra-wisdom-loving Prof. Huemer. Also not widely known: for Rand, her concept of mental integration is, well, integral to her concept of context(-keeping). And that is integral to her concept of hierarchy of thought. (A proper approach to hierarchy would help inform us on if-then style hypotheticals that philosophers to pose; what are not just the implications of the if-clause but the presuppositions? Like, "if the Aristotelian end of history as defined in UP's book were to eventuate, then...". Like, for instance, would UP's book have to have been written first? Is it a realistic hypothetical in the first place? That kinda shit you should get stoned and think through very carefully and thoroughly.
Darn it, I lost a certain train of thought here, for which I blame the weed. Oh wait, now I remember: I supersede 'Aristotelian' and 'dialectic' in the sense that I identify my methods in terms of a principle of intellectual perfectionism, which means (among other things) doing the activity of philosophy as close to perfectly as one feasibly can, but also learning a bunch of shit (for which don't ever trust AOCs under 30) and also possibly fanatical attention to (hopefully the most crucially relevant, philosophically essential) detail. Like Aristotle, Aquinas and/or Rand, for instance? (Also, I think with a probability approaching 100% that a Hegel Dictionary of the sort built by, who was it, Solomon in the 1980s perhaps or Houlgate ca. 2000?), might be part of a whole revived "understanding Hegel" effort that may actually pay off for once, but idk. Just call it the Hegel Lexicon and voila, we've got a volume 2 in a much-anticipated-by-me series. I just get a bit of a kick out of inductively identifying tantalizing principles like that one there.)
[Background music/soundtrack to the foregoing: Pink Floyd favorites, a listing of which is available]
Tuesday, March 26, 2019
What problems would Philosophy for Everyone solve?
What problems wouldn't it solve?
Assuming (correctly) that kids can engage in philosophical activity and that it leads to scientifically-proven benefits (above and beyond the intrinsic goodness of philosophical activity itself as would be attested to by the greatest philosophers), it only stands to reason that adults can engage in it as well. Assume that we can all get on the same page about this and that within, say, a generation, we'll have a philosophically-educated populace (perhaps worldwide). What might that look like?
In Prologue to an Aristotelian End of History, I outline what I take to be the norms, or the form if you will, of a society that has taken up the 'Aristotelian project' to its ultimate expression. (The basic norm of Aristotelianism is something like intellectual perfectionism, and does it get better than perfectionism? How do you improve upon it without incorporating it as a norm? We've reached a normative limit here, I think, and an irrefutable one at that.) I can only speculate on what the outcomes, the matter or content if you will, of such a social order. And at this stage of things I am not sure how exactly to separate issues of said form and said content. For example:
Does this represent talk of form or of content: Philosophy for Everyone (hereafter P4E) would go a very long way toward addressing the aims and concerns of all the major ethical theories. It would satisfy the requirements of consequentialism; see the link above about scientifically-proven benefits for kids. It would satisfy the requirements of deontological theories insofar as those are focused on what it is to treat humans with the utmost respect for their rationality and cognitive freedom. And it certainly satisfies the requirements of virtue ethics insofar as the very activity of philosophy leads to cultivation of good character.
Consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue ethicists may be in disagreement on matters of justification (and Hurka treats perfectionism as a consequentialist theory, but, well, are virtue-ethicists qua intellectual perfectionists also consequentalists in some sense, given the desirability of intellectual perfection qua human telos?), but they can all agree, overlapping-consensus-like, on a prescription for P4E. Then we get everybody on board with a justificatory project which applies standard philosophical methods such as dialectic to identify any and all grains of truth in each of the major schools of ethics.
Then, we get everyone (well, everyone who is minimally interested and there will still be intellectual divisions of labor, etc.) to fully and adequately assess the very principle of intellectual perfectionism as expressing the best of what philosophical inquiry leads us to. In other words, we end up assessing theories as Aristotelian reasoners (whatever else we arrive at as expressing ultimate philosophic inquiry). That is a formal principle of an ultimate social order, but where does that get us, outcomes-wise? That's where I can only speculate. But the very adopting of the formal principle is an outcome of sorts - it'll be a real-world application of some philosophical reasoning, instantiated across a population or populations.
Now, in principle, all this can happen within a generation with the proper information-transmission mechanisms, and I have good reason to believe that this can be done despite all the obstacles thrown up by social media. Whatever else, philosophers as a community need to get on board with the project (and they're being drowned out in the discourse by whatever crap goes viral on social media). But you really don't mess with philosophers, much less with a community of them; if they (in consensus no less) endorse X, they'll have really good reasons for doing so, and beat out objections to X, and soon enough X will be a social norm.
We also have to consider that within a generation from now, AI technology will be a generation more advanced. AI works on the principle of what's called 'machine learning,' and among humans Aristotle has been a premiere instance of (rigorously systematic) human learning. What there is to learn will probably see a convergence between the best of human learning and whatever AI learns. This includes moral truths, and we already see something about what moral consensus can emerge even among disparate schools of ethics -- i.e., that intellectual-perfectionist learning across a population or populations of people is a grand idea, arguments against which would by necessity be self-undermining. (What better argument can you come up with, ethics-wise, than perfectionistic learning being morally obligatory?) Now, our best ethical reasoning and/or most compelling moral truths, indicate that there are goods for conscious agents, and whether or not AI ever becomes conscious, it will recognize goods for us humans qua conscious agents that could not be overriden by what AI learns in addition to that. It's analogous to the best moral reasoning we humans have for how we ought to treat the other animals. (Compare/contrast the state-of-the-art moral reasoning on the ethics of the treatment of animals with current mainstream practice in which, e.g., inhumane factory farming carries on with impunity. Obviously there's a disconnect. Assume that there would be no disconnect between ethical truth and how AI would consider the moral status of humans.)
We should also distinguish "philosophically-educated populace" from "populace of full-time philosophers." There is still intellectual division of labor. But the love of wisdom as an organizing principle of life for all members of a populace can be instilled from a young age and expressed in whatever activities that are suited to each person. Living thoughtfully and intelligently is the common or generic form of human flourishing or eudaimonia or self-actualizing; the content will be expressed on an individualized basis with diverse and complementary excellences.
The form of a philosophically-educated populace would be such that everyone (or near everyone) could blog at the level of this here blog if they so desire. But the content of what they might blog would be anyone's guess. If everyone is blogging (or able to blog) at this level, what builds - presumably exponentially - from that? They're not going to be blogging all day long about the latest celebrity gossip or stupid politician (since politicians wouldn't be stupid any longer), will they? Perhaps once the basic problems of stupidity in politics are solved, and a strong overlapping consensus in ethics is reached (intellectual perfectionism seems to fit the bill pretty well for that), and virtue epistemology is the norm (intellectual perfectionism again), are we left to discuss metaphysics and the arts, which would likely converge on the 'fundamental' topic of philosophy, the meaning of life? I mean, what else are humans going to do with all their time when AI is overseeing the process of material production with all the inexpensive and abundant products being generated (although 'living small' and simply may be the norm of Aristotelian society; I mean, how many SUVs for the sake of getting to nature and family gatherings [first and foremost] would there need to be, assuming a zipcar model is adopted, and how would humans not figure out the optimal arrangements here without input from AI-computed logistics?).
As for politics: I'm not a leftist, i.e., someone hostile to capitalism or to the wisdom of Western tradition. Would a philosophically-educated populace be leftist? The PhilPapers Surveys of philosophers suggest that a plurality of philosophers are egalitarians in politics (given an exhaustive three-way division between positions generically labeled "egalitarian," "libertarian," and "communitarian"). But it's my belief that leftism exists as a program for addressing human problems that P4E would solve anyway. I don't know what exactly would be left for the political sphere if everyone is on philosophy and achieving abundant goods of life as a consequence; politics is about fighting over what would be crumbs in contrast to what would be achieved with P4E. The thing with leftists as they are today - short of their being intellectually enhanced by P4E - is that despite their pretending to possess a superior intellectual and moral compass, they somehow have not figured out that P4E would solve the problems they want to solve. (Is it really inequality per se that's a problem, or not enough people achieving their potentials that's the problem? Gee, that's a no-brainer. Also what should be a no-brainer is a libertarian principle recognizing intellectual-and-hence-practical freedom as a formal condition of properly human living, along with a capitalistic, private-property principle based on the recognition that material value-production originates in the individual, private intellect.)
So I'm not really concerned about P4E turning a plurality of people into leftists. Besides, getting really superior at dialectic involves doing what leftists don't do, and that is addressing the strongest version (as per Dennett/Rapoport Rules) of an opposing position, and in the case of capitalism that would entail having to take on Rand and Mises and Nozick and the 'Dougs' and Sciabarra and other giants of pro-capitalist thought in full good faith. (And it's a two-way street there, but something tells me the libertarians/capitalists, especially the neo-Aristotelian ones such as Rand, the Dougs, and Sciabarra, are ahead of the leftists, who don't seem to talk much about Aristotelian themes.) And once you take on Rand/Dougs/Sciabarra in full good faith you end up taking on Aristotle in full good faith and we're right back to P4E again (or is it A4E, Aristotelianism for Everyone?). (And/or IP4E, Intellectual Perfectionism For Everyone?) There's nothing to be concerned about in regard to where people doing philosophy properly will take them substantive-beliefs-wise. (Also, bullshit political and networking dynamics in academia can't get in the way of P4E/A4E/IP4E fully applied; there can't be the currently-prevailing "liberal" hubris that involves seriously underestimating (capitalist) libertarianism in its strongest, i.e., Aristotelian-intellectualist, formulations.)
A4E would mean doing dialectic in the spirit of Aristotle, and at that level of intellectual productivity we would then have the proper platform upon which to do what is an ultimate dialectical showdown in the making, Aristotle vs. Kant, since we just don't have enough brainpower on this topic yet to figure out how that might go down if these two titans were brought back to life. (Aristotle vs. Kant, mediated by Hegel? Presumably Aristotle already presupposes/incorporates Plato.) I don't know enough about Kant to say yet, but would A4E realize his ideal of a Kingdom of Ends? Does it realize Hegel's conception of an end of history? Does it realize Nietzsche's rather nebulous references to Ubermensch?
And let's not make the silly mistake of assuming that intellectual perfectionism means exclusive focus on perfection of the intellect to the detriment of the other facets of human nature such as emotion (in which we also exceed the other animals in complexity and sophistication); indeed, it is through intellectual perfectionism that we can optimally learn what best actualizes our human potentialities in all facets of life. This includes perfectionism in the area of nutrition and physical fitness science, in which case fitness geniuses such as Cole Robinson and Paul Chek will need to enter into the mainstream cultural dialectic. (And dialectic has something to do, may even be synonymous, with intellectual perfectionism, something about all-embracing learning and culling-together.... Have, e.g, Paul Check and Ken Wilber been 'dialecticized/synthesized' with one another yet? And who all should be 'dialecticizing' with whom? A lot of folks; use your imagination. Cole Robinson knows about Victor Frankl, but does he know about Aristotle? Many gaps to close here, many strands to tie together.)
Speaking of strands to tie together, along with a strict drug regimen to keep one's mind limber, would philosophical activity with P4E or A4E be further stimulated by cannabis used in (Aristotelian) moderation? I'll take that topic up plenty soon in a blog post preparation for which will involve cannabinization, and which will treat of all the subject matter above as already-established presupposition or background (all as a unit, as it were). It should be pretty great.
Assuming (correctly) that kids can engage in philosophical activity and that it leads to scientifically-proven benefits (above and beyond the intrinsic goodness of philosophical activity itself as would be attested to by the greatest philosophers), it only stands to reason that adults can engage in it as well. Assume that we can all get on the same page about this and that within, say, a generation, we'll have a philosophically-educated populace (perhaps worldwide). What might that look like?
In Prologue to an Aristotelian End of History, I outline what I take to be the norms, or the form if you will, of a society that has taken up the 'Aristotelian project' to its ultimate expression. (The basic norm of Aristotelianism is something like intellectual perfectionism, and does it get better than perfectionism? How do you improve upon it without incorporating it as a norm? We've reached a normative limit here, I think, and an irrefutable one at that.) I can only speculate on what the outcomes, the matter or content if you will, of such a social order. And at this stage of things I am not sure how exactly to separate issues of said form and said content. For example:
Does this represent talk of form or of content: Philosophy for Everyone (hereafter P4E) would go a very long way toward addressing the aims and concerns of all the major ethical theories. It would satisfy the requirements of consequentialism; see the link above about scientifically-proven benefits for kids. It would satisfy the requirements of deontological theories insofar as those are focused on what it is to treat humans with the utmost respect for their rationality and cognitive freedom. And it certainly satisfies the requirements of virtue ethics insofar as the very activity of philosophy leads to cultivation of good character.
Consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue ethicists may be in disagreement on matters of justification (and Hurka treats perfectionism as a consequentialist theory, but, well, are virtue-ethicists qua intellectual perfectionists also consequentalists in some sense, given the desirability of intellectual perfection qua human telos?), but they can all agree, overlapping-consensus-like, on a prescription for P4E. Then we get everybody on board with a justificatory project which applies standard philosophical methods such as dialectic to identify any and all grains of truth in each of the major schools of ethics.
Then, we get everyone (well, everyone who is minimally interested and there will still be intellectual divisions of labor, etc.) to fully and adequately assess the very principle of intellectual perfectionism as expressing the best of what philosophical inquiry leads us to. In other words, we end up assessing theories as Aristotelian reasoners (whatever else we arrive at as expressing ultimate philosophic inquiry). That is a formal principle of an ultimate social order, but where does that get us, outcomes-wise? That's where I can only speculate. But the very adopting of the formal principle is an outcome of sorts - it'll be a real-world application of some philosophical reasoning, instantiated across a population or populations.
Now, in principle, all this can happen within a generation with the proper information-transmission mechanisms, and I have good reason to believe that this can be done despite all the obstacles thrown up by social media. Whatever else, philosophers as a community need to get on board with the project (and they're being drowned out in the discourse by whatever crap goes viral on social media). But you really don't mess with philosophers, much less with a community of them; if they (in consensus no less) endorse X, they'll have really good reasons for doing so, and beat out objections to X, and soon enough X will be a social norm.
We also have to consider that within a generation from now, AI technology will be a generation more advanced. AI works on the principle of what's called 'machine learning,' and among humans Aristotle has been a premiere instance of (rigorously systematic) human learning. What there is to learn will probably see a convergence between the best of human learning and whatever AI learns. This includes moral truths, and we already see something about what moral consensus can emerge even among disparate schools of ethics -- i.e., that intellectual-perfectionist learning across a population or populations of people is a grand idea, arguments against which would by necessity be self-undermining. (What better argument can you come up with, ethics-wise, than perfectionistic learning being morally obligatory?) Now, our best ethical reasoning and/or most compelling moral truths, indicate that there are goods for conscious agents, and whether or not AI ever becomes conscious, it will recognize goods for us humans qua conscious agents that could not be overriden by what AI learns in addition to that. It's analogous to the best moral reasoning we humans have for how we ought to treat the other animals. (Compare/contrast the state-of-the-art moral reasoning on the ethics of the treatment of animals with current mainstream practice in which, e.g., inhumane factory farming carries on with impunity. Obviously there's a disconnect. Assume that there would be no disconnect between ethical truth and how AI would consider the moral status of humans.)
We should also distinguish "philosophically-educated populace" from "populace of full-time philosophers." There is still intellectual division of labor. But the love of wisdom as an organizing principle of life for all members of a populace can be instilled from a young age and expressed in whatever activities that are suited to each person. Living thoughtfully and intelligently is the common or generic form of human flourishing or eudaimonia or self-actualizing; the content will be expressed on an individualized basis with diverse and complementary excellences.
The form of a philosophically-educated populace would be such that everyone (or near everyone) could blog at the level of this here blog if they so desire. But the content of what they might blog would be anyone's guess. If everyone is blogging (or able to blog) at this level, what builds - presumably exponentially - from that? They're not going to be blogging all day long about the latest celebrity gossip or stupid politician (since politicians wouldn't be stupid any longer), will they? Perhaps once the basic problems of stupidity in politics are solved, and a strong overlapping consensus in ethics is reached (intellectual perfectionism seems to fit the bill pretty well for that), and virtue epistemology is the norm (intellectual perfectionism again), are we left to discuss metaphysics and the arts, which would likely converge on the 'fundamental' topic of philosophy, the meaning of life? I mean, what else are humans going to do with all their time when AI is overseeing the process of material production with all the inexpensive and abundant products being generated (although 'living small' and simply may be the norm of Aristotelian society; I mean, how many SUVs for the sake of getting to nature and family gatherings [first and foremost] would there need to be, assuming a zipcar model is adopted, and how would humans not figure out the optimal arrangements here without input from AI-computed logistics?).
As for politics: I'm not a leftist, i.e., someone hostile to capitalism or to the wisdom of Western tradition. Would a philosophically-educated populace be leftist? The PhilPapers Surveys of philosophers suggest that a plurality of philosophers are egalitarians in politics (given an exhaustive three-way division between positions generically labeled "egalitarian," "libertarian," and "communitarian"). But it's my belief that leftism exists as a program for addressing human problems that P4E would solve anyway. I don't know what exactly would be left for the political sphere if everyone is on philosophy and achieving abundant goods of life as a consequence; politics is about fighting over what would be crumbs in contrast to what would be achieved with P4E. The thing with leftists as they are today - short of their being intellectually enhanced by P4E - is that despite their pretending to possess a superior intellectual and moral compass, they somehow have not figured out that P4E would solve the problems they want to solve. (Is it really inequality per se that's a problem, or not enough people achieving their potentials that's the problem? Gee, that's a no-brainer. Also what should be a no-brainer is a libertarian principle recognizing intellectual-and-hence-practical freedom as a formal condition of properly human living, along with a capitalistic, private-property principle based on the recognition that material value-production originates in the individual, private intellect.)
So I'm not really concerned about P4E turning a plurality of people into leftists. Besides, getting really superior at dialectic involves doing what leftists don't do, and that is addressing the strongest version (as per Dennett/Rapoport Rules) of an opposing position, and in the case of capitalism that would entail having to take on Rand and Mises and Nozick and the 'Dougs' and Sciabarra and other giants of pro-capitalist thought in full good faith. (And it's a two-way street there, but something tells me the libertarians/capitalists, especially the neo-Aristotelian ones such as Rand, the Dougs, and Sciabarra, are ahead of the leftists, who don't seem to talk much about Aristotelian themes.) And once you take on Rand/Dougs/Sciabarra in full good faith you end up taking on Aristotle in full good faith and we're right back to P4E again (or is it A4E, Aristotelianism for Everyone?). (And/or IP4E, Intellectual Perfectionism For Everyone?) There's nothing to be concerned about in regard to where people doing philosophy properly will take them substantive-beliefs-wise. (Also, bullshit political and networking dynamics in academia can't get in the way of P4E/A4E/IP4E fully applied; there can't be the currently-prevailing "liberal" hubris that involves seriously underestimating (capitalist) libertarianism in its strongest, i.e., Aristotelian-intellectualist, formulations.)
A4E would mean doing dialectic in the spirit of Aristotle, and at that level of intellectual productivity we would then have the proper platform upon which to do what is an ultimate dialectical showdown in the making, Aristotle vs. Kant, since we just don't have enough brainpower on this topic yet to figure out how that might go down if these two titans were brought back to life. (Aristotle vs. Kant, mediated by Hegel? Presumably Aristotle already presupposes/incorporates Plato.) I don't know enough about Kant to say yet, but would A4E realize his ideal of a Kingdom of Ends? Does it realize Hegel's conception of an end of history? Does it realize Nietzsche's rather nebulous references to Ubermensch?
And let's not make the silly mistake of assuming that intellectual perfectionism means exclusive focus on perfection of the intellect to the detriment of the other facets of human nature such as emotion (in which we also exceed the other animals in complexity and sophistication); indeed, it is through intellectual perfectionism that we can optimally learn what best actualizes our human potentialities in all facets of life. This includes perfectionism in the area of nutrition and physical fitness science, in which case fitness geniuses such as Cole Robinson and Paul Chek will need to enter into the mainstream cultural dialectic. (And dialectic has something to do, may even be synonymous, with intellectual perfectionism, something about all-embracing learning and culling-together.... Have, e.g, Paul Check and Ken Wilber been 'dialecticized/synthesized' with one another yet? And who all should be 'dialecticizing' with whom? A lot of folks; use your imagination. Cole Robinson knows about Victor Frankl, but does he know about Aristotle? Many gaps to close here, many strands to tie together.)
Speaking of strands to tie together, along with a strict drug regimen to keep one's mind limber, would philosophical activity with P4E or A4E be further stimulated by cannabis used in (Aristotelian) moderation? I'll take that topic up plenty soon in a blog post preparation for which will involve cannabinization, and which will treat of all the subject matter above as already-established presupposition or background (all as a unit, as it were). It should be pretty great.
Sunday, February 17, 2019
Notes on dialectic
Or: An exercise in advanced differentiation and integration* 75+ hours fasted (with electrolyte water), listening to some favorite music, and cannabinized with just a couple hits of very-residual kief. (* - "Consciousness, as a state of awareness, is not a passive state, but an active process that consists of two essentials: differentiation and integration." --Rand, ITOE, first sentence)
Also: How a dialectic between leading philosophers in history and the likes of Ayn Rand might realistically play out, given a now large and ever growing roster of prominent philosophy professionals now taking a serious interest in her thought.
How might Nietzsche and Rand have 'dialectized' to reach a conclusion they could agree on? Nietzsche spoke of an 'overman', but Rand spoke more matter-of-factly of 'man the rational animal,' a position she claims to have shared in a very deep sense with Aristotle and also Aquinas. ("The three As" Rand would call them. She thought very highly of her own philosophical ability, but didn't proclaim to have surpassed these other two. But the only other philosopher she acknowledged a philosophical debt to, is Aristotle.)
Aristotle, the 'fountainhead of dialectic,' as Chris Matthew Sciabarra, author of Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism (published 2000 by PSU Press, so exhaustively researched as to have a 48-page or approximately 1300-reference bibliography, which is at least 3 times what any other impressively researched academic book would have; the man is thorough) (Also, he wrote an also-thoroughly researched book on Rand, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (1995, PSU), containing the most complete bibliography of Leonard Peikoff materials, especially including Understanding Objectivism, an essential reference source for serious understanding of Rand's philosophy of Objectivism, Peikoff having spent oodles more time discussing philosophical issues with Rand than anyone else, etc. etc., although philosopher (and a serious well-reputed academic one at that) John Hospers also took Rand seriously enough to spend a lot of time discussing philosophical topics as well; but it's materials like Understanding Objectivism that one needs to master in order to be a seriously qualified scholarly commentator on Rand), dubbed him.
Hold on, let's say that it was Aquinas (say) dialecticalizing with Nietzsche (say), and while I haven't spent nearly the time studying these two that I had studied Rand's ideas (mainly for their claimed and real similarity to those of Aristotle, the fucking MAN...although much of my understanding of the fucking MAN comes from solidly reputed secondary sources, e.g., John M. Cooper's 1975 Reason and Human Good in Aristotle...), I can kinda imagine how a dialectic between (pre-Revelation-and-death) Aquinas and the (pre-going-mad) Nietzsche might have transpired, given the basic sensibility-vibe that I get from the various research sources (both primary and secondary) I've consulted on these two. But what if we hypothesize that Nietzsche got to know Aquinas and Aristotle and Rand better than he apparently did, how might a dialectical synthesis between these four (say) figures transpire? What sort of 'overlapping consensus' might they reach?
But wait, for Nietzsche to have become more familiar with these thinkers (most importantly Aristotle?), we have to hypothesize that, at minimum, he had a few more decades of intellectual productivity in him, and as we know from Aristotle and others and hopefully first-hand to a great extent, intellectual productivity is a very lofty thing for a human being to aspire to. I don't know how long it would have taken for Nietzsche to get around to a serious and close study of Aristotle.
One thing I do know, is that in Walter Kaufmann's (leading Nietzsche scholar and fairly prominent philosopher in his own right) translation of Beyond Good and Evil, namely aphorism 287 (or is it 257) about the noble soul having reverence for itself, Kaufmann makes a footnoted reference to Aristotle on the great-souled man. But it's that same aphorism that Rand had originally considered placing at the beginning of The Fountainhead, my pick for her best novel even though Atlas Shrugged has a great many virtues, as aesthetics-expert Hospers highlighted. This is during the phase of her career when Nietzsche was her primary intellectual influence (aside from herself, obviously) (and there was also Isabel Paterson), but it was within a few years that Aristotle (and secondarily Aquinas) became the chief intellectual influence to the point she acknowledged a philosophical debt only to him. Anyway, all three of the thinkers - Aristotle, Nietzsche, Rand - seem to be in fundamental agreement about a great-souled man or noble soul having reverence for itself, a fundamental component of Rand's distinctive variety of egoism for sure. So why isn't she taken that much more seriously by academic philosophers already? Good question. One thing is, few if any of them were in the epistemic position that, say, Hospers was in, now were they.
Anyway, if we could get these three rather meticulous thinkers to agree on that premise - I say if, but I think it's a given? - about the great-souled and (therefore?) Randian-egoistic man, then shouldn't that inform a dominant new paradigm in ethical thinking?
What is dialectic, anyway? Sciabarra refers to it as "the art of context-keeping" (a fundamental focus of Understanding Objectivism, the chief methodological 'treatise' of Objectivism, duh.), and I take his Total Freedom to be a pretty complete - indeed 'dialectically complete or perfectionistic' - exercise in the art of context-keeping, starting with that fucking massive bibliography. (There are two books that I know of with larger bibliographies: Pinker's The Better Angels of Our Nature (Rand's phrase "in the name of the best within us" comes to mind in this context) and T.H. Irwin's monumental 3-volume, 5000-ish-page-equivalent The Development of Ethics (OUP, 2008). Irwin is I think definitely most impressed with the Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical tradition, no surprise given how he compares them exhaustively with prominent alternatives including even Kant. All three of these books strike me as seriously impressive; what if they were in some way dialectically synthesized together along with the putative Aristotelian-Nietzsche-Randian synthesis about ethical egoism or individualism or eudaimonist-individualism or individualist-perfectionism, etc.
And funny I should bring up individualist-perfectionism, since that's a key theme of neo-Aristotelians Douglas Rasmussen (a Catholic who could be the leading authority on how Randian and Thomistic thought might be synthesized) and Douglas Den Uyl. Funny I should bring them up, since they did a response to Nozick on the Randian argument and I hadn't even brought Nozick up. Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia was praised on the back cover by some prominent philosopher type as exhibiting an unsurpassed 'dialectical sensibility,' which it arguably does. Does this mean that he out-dialecticizes Rawls? Does anyone out-dialecticize Alan Gewirth, who wrote the book Self-Fulfillment (1998, PUP, at age 86, mind you) and Reason and Morality (1978, Chicago UP), the key themes of which are defended in Deryck Byleveld's daunting-looking 1991 book, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defense of Alan Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC)? That book looks thoroughly researched as well. Does dialectical completeness require some sort of positive rights after all? But if everyone adopts an Aristotelian-Nietzsche-Randian ethos about eudaimonistic individualistic perfectionist dialectical-completist, etc., would positive rights ever be a factor at that point, with everyone flourishing so? But is that realistic? Well, let's say we stage for a national audience a debate (well, dialectic) between long-dead but now-taken-very-seriously figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, et al, and see what kind of overlapping consensus they reach.
I'm not talking about intellectually lazy trolls on social media, now, I'm talking serious dialectical synthesis here.
Assume that all these thinkers in this staged debate/dialectic are adequately informed of at least a lot of the scholarship and philosophical writing that has occurred since their actual lifetimes. Would they all at least agree that you can only hope to match but not exceed Aristotle? Dougs Rasmussen and Den Uyl (RDU) appear to do so, and they're pretty dialectically complete, too, and they also happen to be in fundamental agreement (from all available indications) with Sciabarra about that (Aristotle the fountainhead of dialectic being among them, eudaimonism in ethics being another, and so on). Indeed, one must think of post-2000 RDU writings as having dialectically presupposed Total Freedom (a unit that condenses another 1300-ish units, we might say, or the way an internet link can condense a reference to a wider context within one word...), which makes it that much more dialectically complete. (What if Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism and (RDU's) Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics (2006, PSU) translate into essentially the same idea?) But have they dialecticized with Gewirth? Not that I know of, beyond Den Uyl's 1970s article on what he then referred to as Gewirth's Principle of Categorial Consistency or PCC at the time, but I do remember reading Rasmussen vs. Sterba in a 1987-ish book, The Catholic Bishops and the Economy: A Debate, and I'm not sure the debate there was resolved to my complete satisfaction.
(okay, that was composed during a listen of the 50-minute album Yellow House by Grizzly Bear, currently #6 on my list of favorites. to be continued, or have I made my point? ^_^ )
also, context-keeping and integration (a key focus of Rand's, and Peikoff's lecture courses and books) are essentially the same process. I.e., integration and dialectical synthesis are the same process. Where does Marx fit into all this, I haven't even mentioned him yet. But then I have to bring up Mises and Kolakowski, i.e., see how they fit into, i.e., integrate with these other concrete instances (of thinkers), and so on and so on. But how can I understand all these other thinkers to the same extent, with the same resource-constraints, that I studied and understood Rand so extensively? (My one "peer reviewed professional literature publication" is on Rand. My book was reviewed by a few esteemed peers (including an academic neo-Aristotelian philosopher) and passed with flying colors, I also think it's pretty good shit...but almost sure to be overshadowed by BLTP....)
also, dialectical completeness has something fundamental/essential to do with perfectionism in the philosophical tradition (of whom Aristotle was an exemplar, given his dialectical completeness, i.e., perfectionism and - therefore ultimately - intellectual perfectionism). Also, Rand is some sort of intellectual perfectionist (although she didn't seem to think that theoretical contemplation was the highest or most noble of the intellectual activities, but seemed to include all activities resulting from intensive focus, a fundamental that would lie at any account of 'Randian perfectionism' and perhaps arguably any similar perfectionist account such as the Dougs').
Also, Norton's eudaimonist perfectionist individualist self-actualization-ethics fits into all this quite beautifully, synthesizing ancient Greek themes with themes from modern psychologists like Jung (a big 'individuation' guy) and Maslow (hierarchy of needs or objective goods).
Ok so that's about an hour and 8 minutes worth of output, not bad I guess. Some promising, uh, leads anyway.
also this should tie in (integrate) closely with any philosophy curricula for children, duh.
1.5hrs spent after edits/additions, and the cannabuzz is gone. later?... (Next up?: How would Aristotle blog, cannabanized and fasted? Or: Aspiring to great-souled dialectical perfection/integration/kalon, etc.) (Is this one chock full of enough thorough-research-derived contextualizing links/leads yet? Hell, I hadn't even brought up Hegel yet, but Sciabarra incorporates his insights as well. And what did Hegel think of Aristotle? Surely Ferrarin (2001, CUP, post-dating Total Freedom by one year...) has insights there.)
Also: How a dialectic between leading philosophers in history and the likes of Ayn Rand might realistically play out, given a now large and ever growing roster of prominent philosophy professionals now taking a serious interest in her thought.
How might Nietzsche and Rand have 'dialectized' to reach a conclusion they could agree on? Nietzsche spoke of an 'overman', but Rand spoke more matter-of-factly of 'man the rational animal,' a position she claims to have shared in a very deep sense with Aristotle and also Aquinas. ("The three As" Rand would call them. She thought very highly of her own philosophical ability, but didn't proclaim to have surpassed these other two. But the only other philosopher she acknowledged a philosophical debt to, is Aristotle.)
Aristotle, the 'fountainhead of dialectic,' as Chris Matthew Sciabarra, author of Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism (published 2000 by PSU Press, so exhaustively researched as to have a 48-page or approximately 1300-reference bibliography, which is at least 3 times what any other impressively researched academic book would have; the man is thorough) (Also, he wrote an also-thoroughly researched book on Rand, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (1995, PSU), containing the most complete bibliography of Leonard Peikoff materials, especially including Understanding Objectivism, an essential reference source for serious understanding of Rand's philosophy of Objectivism, Peikoff having spent oodles more time discussing philosophical issues with Rand than anyone else, etc. etc., although philosopher (and a serious well-reputed academic one at that) John Hospers also took Rand seriously enough to spend a lot of time discussing philosophical topics as well; but it's materials like Understanding Objectivism that one needs to master in order to be a seriously qualified scholarly commentator on Rand), dubbed him.
Hold on, let's say that it was Aquinas (say) dialecticalizing with Nietzsche (say), and while I haven't spent nearly the time studying these two that I had studied Rand's ideas (mainly for their claimed and real similarity to those of Aristotle, the fucking MAN...although much of my understanding of the fucking MAN comes from solidly reputed secondary sources, e.g., John M. Cooper's 1975 Reason and Human Good in Aristotle...), I can kinda imagine how a dialectic between (pre-Revelation-and-death) Aquinas and the (pre-going-mad) Nietzsche might have transpired, given the basic sensibility-vibe that I get from the various research sources (both primary and secondary) I've consulted on these two. But what if we hypothesize that Nietzsche got to know Aquinas and Aristotle and Rand better than he apparently did, how might a dialectical synthesis between these four (say) figures transpire? What sort of 'overlapping consensus' might they reach?
But wait, for Nietzsche to have become more familiar with these thinkers (most importantly Aristotle?), we have to hypothesize that, at minimum, he had a few more decades of intellectual productivity in him, and as we know from Aristotle and others and hopefully first-hand to a great extent, intellectual productivity is a very lofty thing for a human being to aspire to. I don't know how long it would have taken for Nietzsche to get around to a serious and close study of Aristotle.
One thing I do know, is that in Walter Kaufmann's (leading Nietzsche scholar and fairly prominent philosopher in his own right) translation of Beyond Good and Evil, namely aphorism 287 (or is it 257) about the noble soul having reverence for itself, Kaufmann makes a footnoted reference to Aristotle on the great-souled man. But it's that same aphorism that Rand had originally considered placing at the beginning of The Fountainhead, my pick for her best novel even though Atlas Shrugged has a great many virtues, as aesthetics-expert Hospers highlighted. This is during the phase of her career when Nietzsche was her primary intellectual influence (aside from herself, obviously) (and there was also Isabel Paterson), but it was within a few years that Aristotle (and secondarily Aquinas) became the chief intellectual influence to the point she acknowledged a philosophical debt only to him. Anyway, all three of the thinkers - Aristotle, Nietzsche, Rand - seem to be in fundamental agreement about a great-souled man or noble soul having reverence for itself, a fundamental component of Rand's distinctive variety of egoism for sure. So why isn't she taken that much more seriously by academic philosophers already? Good question. One thing is, few if any of them were in the epistemic position that, say, Hospers was in, now were they.
Anyway, if we could get these three rather meticulous thinkers to agree on that premise - I say if, but I think it's a given? - about the great-souled and (therefore?) Randian-egoistic man, then shouldn't that inform a dominant new paradigm in ethical thinking?
What is dialectic, anyway? Sciabarra refers to it as "the art of context-keeping" (a fundamental focus of Understanding Objectivism, the chief methodological 'treatise' of Objectivism, duh.), and I take his Total Freedom to be a pretty complete - indeed 'dialectically complete or perfectionistic' - exercise in the art of context-keeping, starting with that fucking massive bibliography. (There are two books that I know of with larger bibliographies: Pinker's The Better Angels of Our Nature (Rand's phrase "in the name of the best within us" comes to mind in this context) and T.H. Irwin's monumental 3-volume, 5000-ish-page-equivalent The Development of Ethics (OUP, 2008). Irwin is I think definitely most impressed with the Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical tradition, no surprise given how he compares them exhaustively with prominent alternatives including even Kant. All three of these books strike me as seriously impressive; what if they were in some way dialectically synthesized together along with the putative Aristotelian-Nietzsche-Randian synthesis about ethical egoism or individualism or eudaimonist-individualism or individualist-perfectionism, etc.
And funny I should bring up individualist-perfectionism, since that's a key theme of neo-Aristotelians Douglas Rasmussen (a Catholic who could be the leading authority on how Randian and Thomistic thought might be synthesized) and Douglas Den Uyl. Funny I should bring them up, since they did a response to Nozick on the Randian argument and I hadn't even brought Nozick up. Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia was praised on the back cover by some prominent philosopher type as exhibiting an unsurpassed 'dialectical sensibility,' which it arguably does. Does this mean that he out-dialecticizes Rawls? Does anyone out-dialecticize Alan Gewirth, who wrote the book Self-Fulfillment (1998, PUP, at age 86, mind you) and Reason and Morality (1978, Chicago UP), the key themes of which are defended in Deryck Byleveld's daunting-looking 1991 book, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defense of Alan Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC)? That book looks thoroughly researched as well. Does dialectical completeness require some sort of positive rights after all? But if everyone adopts an Aristotelian-Nietzsche-Randian ethos about eudaimonistic individualistic perfectionist dialectical-completist, etc., would positive rights ever be a factor at that point, with everyone flourishing so? But is that realistic? Well, let's say we stage for a national audience a debate (well, dialectic) between long-dead but now-taken-very-seriously figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, et al, and see what kind of overlapping consensus they reach.
I'm not talking about intellectually lazy trolls on social media, now, I'm talking serious dialectical synthesis here.
Assume that all these thinkers in this staged debate/dialectic are adequately informed of at least a lot of the scholarship and philosophical writing that has occurred since their actual lifetimes. Would they all at least agree that you can only hope to match but not exceed Aristotle? Dougs Rasmussen and Den Uyl (RDU) appear to do so, and they're pretty dialectically complete, too, and they also happen to be in fundamental agreement (from all available indications) with Sciabarra about that (Aristotle the fountainhead of dialectic being among them, eudaimonism in ethics being another, and so on). Indeed, one must think of post-2000 RDU writings as having dialectically presupposed Total Freedom (a unit that condenses another 1300-ish units, we might say, or the way an internet link can condense a reference to a wider context within one word...), which makes it that much more dialectically complete. (What if Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism and (RDU's) Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics (2006, PSU) translate into essentially the same idea?) But have they dialecticized with Gewirth? Not that I know of, beyond Den Uyl's 1970s article on what he then referred to as Gewirth's Principle of Categorial Consistency or PCC at the time, but I do remember reading Rasmussen vs. Sterba in a 1987-ish book, The Catholic Bishops and the Economy: A Debate, and I'm not sure the debate there was resolved to my complete satisfaction.
(okay, that was composed during a listen of the 50-minute album Yellow House by Grizzly Bear, currently #6 on my list of favorites. to be continued, or have I made my point? ^_^ )
also, context-keeping and integration (a key focus of Rand's, and Peikoff's lecture courses and books) are essentially the same process. I.e., integration and dialectical synthesis are the same process. Where does Marx fit into all this, I haven't even mentioned him yet. But then I have to bring up Mises and Kolakowski, i.e., see how they fit into, i.e., integrate with these other concrete instances (of thinkers), and so on and so on. But how can I understand all these other thinkers to the same extent, with the same resource-constraints, that I studied and understood Rand so extensively? (My one "peer reviewed professional literature publication" is on Rand. My book was reviewed by a few esteemed peers (including an academic neo-Aristotelian philosopher) and passed with flying colors, I also think it's pretty good shit...but almost sure to be overshadowed by BLTP....)
also, dialectical completeness has something fundamental/essential to do with perfectionism in the philosophical tradition (of whom Aristotle was an exemplar, given his dialectical completeness, i.e., perfectionism and - therefore ultimately - intellectual perfectionism). Also, Rand is some sort of intellectual perfectionist (although she didn't seem to think that theoretical contemplation was the highest or most noble of the intellectual activities, but seemed to include all activities resulting from intensive focus, a fundamental that would lie at any account of 'Randian perfectionism' and perhaps arguably any similar perfectionist account such as the Dougs').
Also, Norton's eudaimonist perfectionist individualist self-actualization-ethics fits into all this quite beautifully, synthesizing ancient Greek themes with themes from modern psychologists like Jung (a big 'individuation' guy) and Maslow (hierarchy of needs or objective goods).
Ok so that's about an hour and 8 minutes worth of output, not bad I guess. Some promising, uh, leads anyway.
also this should tie in (integrate) closely with any philosophy curricula for children, duh.
1.5hrs spent after edits/additions, and the cannabuzz is gone. later?... (Next up?: How would Aristotle blog, cannabanized and fasted? Or: Aspiring to great-souled dialectical perfection/integration/kalon, etc.) (Is this one chock full of enough thorough-research-derived contextualizing links/leads yet? Hell, I hadn't even brought up Hegel yet, but Sciabarra incorporates his insights as well. And what did Hegel think of Aristotle? Surely Ferrarin (2001, CUP, post-dating Total Freedom by one year...) has insights there.)
Friday, January 11, 2019
Why aren't all philosophers Aristotelians?
Philosophers more than any other category of people are headed in the direction, onto the scent, of the idea that all human problems are fundamentally intellectual in nature -- that if we can solve or better address questions that are fundamentally intellectual in nature (namely, how we reason adequately), we'll go a very long way if not all the way to addressing all other human problems and challenges. (Say that someone offered as a contrast idea that all our problems will be solved by technology? But isn't the discovery and better application of better technologies at its root an intellectual (e.g., scientific and therefore epistemological) issue?
Plato and Aristotle - but it would seem Aristotle even more, from the overall vibes I get from these writers - identify the human form and essence (are these the same thing?) as the rational or intellectual capacity, the ability to think in terms of universals or concepts (are these the same thing?). Plato would speak in terms of the proper ordering of the human soul with the rational part in charge, which goes quite a way in its own right to get the program just right, while Aristotle makes the perfection of the rational part, that very essence of man, the ultimate normative standard by which to characterize a flourishing life. So if philosophers are really into the whole "perfecting the rational part of us" idea, why wouldn't that make them specifically Aristotelians as well? In ethics, to be an Aristotelian is to endorse the idea, in some fashion or other, that the good life, the most perfect life attainable to us, is defined ultimately by reference to how we use our specifically rational activity. (Not coincidentally, this is the faculty under direct control and review by human agents themselves; this is the phenomenon referred to as free will.)
Ayn Rand, who was rather quite comfortable with referring to herself as an Aristotelian, while dismissing almost wholesale the rest of the history of philosophy (Aquinas being a rare, standout exception), put this idea in the following terms:
This looks like a statement that every philosopher could, would, and should endorse. But how would it not make them Aristotelians (and, if they do their homework, Randians), all of them? Kantian and utilitarian ethics don't seem to express this idea in a clear-cut way - certainly not the utilitarian one, which focuses our attention upon to good experiences as the primary criterion of the good, while Kant does home in on our rational/intellectual agency as ethically fundamental and meriting respect, and states that the only thing good without qualification is a good will, but how about the Aristotelian idea that our most ethically perfect and most flourishing life (are these the same thing?) must contain in every activity some form or other of intellectual perfection. Isn't perfecting our intellectual capacity the best way we could express and enact our good/better/best wills, in any case? Good intentions are nice, but what if we perfect the science of improving people's lives through the perfection of our epistemological (volitional-cognitive) practices, then how much more fruitful would our intentions be? And how about if we take a giant leap for mankind in that process by spreading philosophical learning far and wide, including for children? And this education, pursued with optimal rigor, will lead to Aristotelian intellectual perfectionism as the most basic normative principle for living, correct?
If Aristotelians are better and more homed in on the intellectual-perfectionist essential here than philosophers of other traditions have been, this would be evidence for a thesis that Aristotelianism is a better way of doing philosophy itself than the other traditions are. To get thorough/complete/perfectionist on this we would need to do a rank-ordering in terms of better-thinking/living fruits yielded. Anyway, all activities that characterize human flourishing, Aristotelian-style, involve inter alia the perfection of the intellectual capacity, as like the form of human flourishing to whatever is the content of the activity. (Not only does this conception of ethics and eudaimonic activity have something of an aesthetic appeal to it, but it sounds distinctively Aristotelian in both the form of framing it and and in content. ^_^ ) Stated another way: human flourishing or eudaimonia, Aristotelian-style, is thoughtful or intelligent living.
My view of Aristotle in relation to the rest of the history of philosophy is something as follows: You can only hope to match him but not exceed him. He's the first to discover and fully implement a program of intellectual perfectionism (a maximally sprawling research program in his case, as full-time philosopher by profession) and quite self-consciously so. (So why wasn't, say, Bertrand Russell an avowed Aristotelian? How could his shoddy treatment of Aristotle in his History of Western Philosophy be at such variance with that of a Kenny, Cooper, Irwin, Barnes, Shields, et al? Assuredly more intellectual perfection needs to happen for everyone to get on the same page about the A-man.)
Plato and Aristotle - but it would seem Aristotle even more, from the overall vibes I get from these writers - identify the human form and essence (are these the same thing?) as the rational or intellectual capacity, the ability to think in terms of universals or concepts (are these the same thing?). Plato would speak in terms of the proper ordering of the human soul with the rational part in charge, which goes quite a way in its own right to get the program just right, while Aristotle makes the perfection of the rational part, that very essence of man, the ultimate normative standard by which to characterize a flourishing life. So if philosophers are really into the whole "perfecting the rational part of us" idea, why wouldn't that make them specifically Aristotelians as well? In ethics, to be an Aristotelian is to endorse the idea, in some fashion or other, that the good life, the most perfect life attainable to us, is defined ultimately by reference to how we use our specifically rational activity. (Not coincidentally, this is the faculty under direct control and review by human agents themselves; this is the phenomenon referred to as free will.)
Ayn Rand, who was rather quite comfortable with referring to herself as an Aristotelian, while dismissing almost wholesale the rest of the history of philosophy (Aquinas being a rare, standout exception), put this idea in the following terms:
Man has a single basic choice: to think or not, and that is the gauge of his virtue. Moral perfection is an unbreached rationality—not the degree of your intelligence, but the full and relentless use of your mind, not the extent of your knowledge, but the acceptance of reason as an absolute.
This looks like a statement that every philosopher could, would, and should endorse. But how would it not make them Aristotelians (and, if they do their homework, Randians), all of them? Kantian and utilitarian ethics don't seem to express this idea in a clear-cut way - certainly not the utilitarian one, which focuses our attention upon to good experiences as the primary criterion of the good, while Kant does home in on our rational/intellectual agency as ethically fundamental and meriting respect, and states that the only thing good without qualification is a good will, but how about the Aristotelian idea that our most ethically perfect and most flourishing life (are these the same thing?) must contain in every activity some form or other of intellectual perfection. Isn't perfecting our intellectual capacity the best way we could express and enact our good/better/best wills, in any case? Good intentions are nice, but what if we perfect the science of improving people's lives through the perfection of our epistemological (volitional-cognitive) practices, then how much more fruitful would our intentions be? And how about if we take a giant leap for mankind in that process by spreading philosophical learning far and wide, including for children? And this education, pursued with optimal rigor, will lead to Aristotelian intellectual perfectionism as the most basic normative principle for living, correct?
If Aristotelians are better and more homed in on the intellectual-perfectionist essential here than philosophers of other traditions have been, this would be evidence for a thesis that Aristotelianism is a better way of doing philosophy itself than the other traditions are. To get thorough/complete/perfectionist on this we would need to do a rank-ordering in terms of better-thinking/living fruits yielded. Anyway, all activities that characterize human flourishing, Aristotelian-style, involve inter alia the perfection of the intellectual capacity, as like the form of human flourishing to whatever is the content of the activity. (Not only does this conception of ethics and eudaimonic activity have something of an aesthetic appeal to it, but it sounds distinctively Aristotelian in both the form of framing it and and in content. ^_^ ) Stated another way: human flourishing or eudaimonia, Aristotelian-style, is thoughtful or intelligent living.
My view of Aristotle in relation to the rest of the history of philosophy is something as follows: You can only hope to match him but not exceed him. He's the first to discover and fully implement a program of intellectual perfectionism (a maximally sprawling research program in his case, as full-time philosopher by profession) and quite self-consciously so. (So why wasn't, say, Bertrand Russell an avowed Aristotelian? How could his shoddy treatment of Aristotle in his History of Western Philosophy be at such variance with that of a Kenny, Cooper, Irwin, Barnes, Shields, et al? Assuredly more intellectual perfection needs to happen for everyone to get on the same page about the A-man.)
Sunday, December 2, 2018
Better living through philosophy, in broad outline
In which Ultimate Philosopher addresses the question, "Is there definitive evidence, man, that better living and philosophy go together?" and then such related questions as "What if we encounter one miserable philosopher, doesn't that falsify a better-living-through-philosophy hypothesis" and then "Isn't part of wisdom learning not to be miserable (as distinct from, say, 'in physical pain'), like, ever, and isn't philosophy after all the pursuit or search for wisdom which is distinct from the having of wisdom or sagacity itself" and then such related questions about the meaning of life, etc.
So, let's begin. What is better living? In short, whatever it is that the ancients (Aristotle first and foremost, of course . . .) were getting at with the concept of eudaimonia. Happiness, flourishing, comprehensive well-being, . . . a modern rendition of the concept is found in self-actualization psychology associated with Maslow and others.
Next question: are there real-world examples of self-actualized or eudaimonic philosophers, not merely philosophers who seek these things but also attain these things? It is helpful to have real-world examples to go by. How do we go about identifying who a philosopher is, anyway? And surely we need to be able to distinguish between a mere philosopher and a sage, so getting the definition of 'philosopher' correct is important (for purposes of this discussion, etc.). To best answer that question is to get into the topic of 'metaphilosophy' or philosophy (asking questions about, thinking through thoroughly, more to follow below) about philosophy. Just what are the necessary and sufficient conditions, etc., for someone to be engaging in what we correctly identify as philosophic activity?
Philosophy is something something love or pursuit or seeking after wisdom, with the goal or telos of such activity being an actual sage. A sage is one who has attained wisdom, and so what is wisdom you might ask? Ah, what is wisdom. How do we know when we have found it if we do not yet possess it? We could say numerous things about wisdom and hopefully identify fundamental features in common to those things to form a working definition of wisdom. Okay, so I'll cheat and see what google says. "the quality of having experience, knowledge, and good judgment; the quality of being wise.
synonyms: sagacity, intelligence, sense, common sense, shrewdness, astuteness, smartness, judiciousness, judgment, prudence, circumspection
So, like I hear about these wiseguys, you know, goodfellas? Michael Corleone, did he possess these features? He had to be pretty good at what he was doing to run an empire like that. Keep your friends close and enemies closer, etc. Or, how about when the "Meth Milf" Lydia Rodarte-Quayle from Breaking Bad discusses whether it would be, you know, wise to have Mike's good men bumped off. That's not the wisdom the likes of Socrates, Plato and of course (duh) Aristotle spoke about, but it's something called wisdom by some, and we need to have strict guidelines for distinguishing fool's gold from the real. And what if Corleone or the Meth Milf do possess some of the characteristics provided by the google algorithm? Are those good characteristics to have no matter the context? What about smartness, anyway? Is that ever bad? Can one be more clever than smart, more smart than wise?
Wisdom has a synonym in the ancient Greek, scientia or some form of systematized or organized knowing. In this context it is unavoidable for me to recall a portion of historian-of-philosophy Will Durant's summary statement of Kant: "Science is organized knowledge; wisdom is organized life." Wisdom is organized life, philosophy is the love of wisdom, therefore by ironclad deduction philosophy is love of organized life, QED, shows over, philosophy 1, non-philosophy zero. (Plato proved this over 2,000 years ago and yet humanity has not taken to Plato in all this time. Is it a communication problem? Shit.)
Humans are distinguished from the animals by the faculty of intellect or reason, which enables thought and the ability to express them via language. Intellect or reason itself is present enough in the activities of nearly all human beings (not in the category of the developmentally disabled, say) that it serves to organize experiences into a systematic-enough whole to get by to varying degrees of success in daily and often routine affairs. But the light of independent thought and initiative and creativity is still in there, enough for legal (including criminal) responsibilities. Some element of free will that accounts for about 30% of our life circumstances (the other 70% roughly evenly divided between genetics and environment/upbringing).
Moving on. It is systematic approaches to reasoning in specialized areas of knowledge we tend to put under the heading of 'the sciences.' But philosophy is something about organizing our thought processes at a higher level of sorts, of bringing together all our reasoning processes under a higher-order level of systematicity, enough so that it takes on the task of "organized living". The pursuit of wisdom seems to be, in addition to anything else, the pursuit of better or organized living. And this seems to happen via a process known as philosophy.
Time out for a moment. The first google result for 'philosophy' is:
So, let's begin. What is better living? In short, whatever it is that the ancients (Aristotle first and foremost, of course . . .) were getting at with the concept of eudaimonia. Happiness, flourishing, comprehensive well-being, . . . a modern rendition of the concept is found in self-actualization psychology associated with Maslow and others.
Next question: are there real-world examples of self-actualized or eudaimonic philosophers, not merely philosophers who seek these things but also attain these things? It is helpful to have real-world examples to go by. How do we go about identifying who a philosopher is, anyway? And surely we need to be able to distinguish between a mere philosopher and a sage, so getting the definition of 'philosopher' correct is important (for purposes of this discussion, etc.). To best answer that question is to get into the topic of 'metaphilosophy' or philosophy (asking questions about, thinking through thoroughly, more to follow below) about philosophy. Just what are the necessary and sufficient conditions, etc., for someone to be engaging in what we correctly identify as philosophic activity?
Philosophy is something something love or pursuit or seeking after wisdom, with the goal or telos of such activity being an actual sage. A sage is one who has attained wisdom, and so what is wisdom you might ask? Ah, what is wisdom. How do we know when we have found it if we do not yet possess it? We could say numerous things about wisdom and hopefully identify fundamental features in common to those things to form a working definition of wisdom. Okay, so I'll cheat and see what google says. "the quality of having experience, knowledge, and good judgment; the quality of being wise.
synonyms: sagacity, intelligence, sense, common sense, shrewdness, astuteness, smartness, judiciousness, judgment, prudence, circumspection
So, like I hear about these wiseguys, you know, goodfellas? Michael Corleone, did he possess these features? He had to be pretty good at what he was doing to run an empire like that. Keep your friends close and enemies closer, etc. Or, how about when the "Meth Milf" Lydia Rodarte-Quayle from Breaking Bad discusses whether it would be, you know, wise to have Mike's good men bumped off. That's not the wisdom the likes of Socrates, Plato and of course (duh) Aristotle spoke about, but it's something called wisdom by some, and we need to have strict guidelines for distinguishing fool's gold from the real. And what if Corleone or the Meth Milf do possess some of the characteristics provided by the google algorithm? Are those good characteristics to have no matter the context? What about smartness, anyway? Is that ever bad? Can one be more clever than smart, more smart than wise?
Wisdom has a synonym in the ancient Greek, scientia or some form of systematized or organized knowing. In this context it is unavoidable for me to recall a portion of historian-of-philosophy Will Durant's summary statement of Kant: "Science is organized knowledge; wisdom is organized life." Wisdom is organized life, philosophy is the love of wisdom, therefore by ironclad deduction philosophy is love of organized life, QED, shows over, philosophy 1, non-philosophy zero. (Plato proved this over 2,000 years ago and yet humanity has not taken to Plato in all this time. Is it a communication problem? Shit.)
Humans are distinguished from the animals by the faculty of intellect or reason, which enables thought and the ability to express them via language. Intellect or reason itself is present enough in the activities of nearly all human beings (not in the category of the developmentally disabled, say) that it serves to organize experiences into a systematic-enough whole to get by to varying degrees of success in daily and often routine affairs. But the light of independent thought and initiative and creativity is still in there, enough for legal (including criminal) responsibilities. Some element of free will that accounts for about 30% of our life circumstances (the other 70% roughly evenly divided between genetics and environment/upbringing).
Moving on. It is systematic approaches to reasoning in specialized areas of knowledge we tend to put under the heading of 'the sciences.' But philosophy is something about organizing our thought processes at a higher level of sorts, of bringing together all our reasoning processes under a higher-order level of systematicity, enough so that it takes on the task of "organized living". The pursuit of wisdom seems to be, in addition to anything else, the pursuit of better or organized living. And this seems to happen via a process known as philosophy.
Time out for a moment. The first google result for 'philosophy' is:
philosophy | skin care | fragrance | bath & body | gifts philosophy.
So philosophy as something to do with, like, beauty? Are there objective teleological standards for beauty? Is there an organized field of knowledge that deals with this subject?
Now, I have in mind something more like what appears on the right sidebar:
Description
Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems concerning matters such as existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language. The term was probably coined by Pythagoras. Philosophical methods include questioning, critical discussion, rational argument, and systematic presentation. Wikipedia
So somehow there's a connection - I'm not entirely clear on it myself at this point - between "the study of general and fundamental problems concerning matters such as existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language" and self-improvement! which is what Better Living Through Philosophy might very well best be marketed as? Have you seen philosophy journal articles where "fundamental problems concerning matters such as existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language" are discussed? A bunch of it almost goes right over my head especially if I'm not reading carefully. Some of these things just don't interest me that much: I'm more interested in that field known as 'ethics' (link above) than I am in getting it exactly just right whether our conception of substance (this would be in the branch of metaphysics, mysteriously not linked above) is best understood in Aristotelian or Thomistic terms much less Leibnizian or Spinozist terms. (Is there a difference between Aristotelian and Thomistic conceptions, and even if there is one, are these the best two candidates to choose from, vis a vis the likes of Leibniz and Spinoza? Yeah, I think they may be pretty good candidates. But like I said, given only so much available time my own personal focus has been more squarely on the topic of ethics. This is not at all to say that getting a fully systematized understanding of our ethical concepts won't rely on metaphysical ones. But then they might also have to rely on aesthetic ones as well, and that seems like a rather under-served area in philosophy; only a few of the most canonized philosophers - little overlap with specialists who've made their name in aesthetics (Danto, say?) - delved into that subject matter. What is there to say about whatever it is that aesthetics studies, anyway, and what relation does it have to better living / self-help?
So there's something about the activity of philosophy - which encompasses not just (science-like) knowing or wisdom accumulation but also the activity of putting whatever wisdom obtained so far to use in organizing or systematizing the art of living better, but also an activity distinctive to philosophy per se: thought. It is, ultimately, the activity of thought that itself aspires toward a systematic unity or completeness or wholeness, and so atop the hierarchy of the human sciences is philosophy, basically a science of what it is to live functionally or well as a human being.
This is basically the essential idea of what I think "better living through philosophy" is aiming toward, the rest being application, examples, a treatise-length fleshing-out.
Now, let's say that there are better modes of doing philosophy itself than others. There are plenty of great philosophers in history but what crucial features account for some philosophers being more influential than others? (Why isn't a pessimist like Schopenhauer a lot more influential than someone who's more optimistic like Aristotle who believes humans - well, Athenian citizens at least - are in principle equipped for eudaimonia? If pessimism is true, shouldn't it sell? And why hasn't the full range of wisdom of Plato and Aristotle, at minimum, rubbed off on all school children all of 2,000 years later? Communication barriers? Really? Surely I could get polemical about the "progressive"-run schools but I'll keep it clean here. I'll just say that a truly progressive mindset gets you to Aristotelian wisdom-pursuit and I wish I were seeing a lot more of that explicitly and systematically instilled in schools.)
So there are better and worse ways of doing philosophy, let's assume. We should then have some way of ordering the different approaches and styles and methods (METHODS!!!) according to their value (teleological ranking). Through to their (methods') fruits ye shall know them. Aristotle knew a ton of shit - founded biology as a science that was authoritative for 2,000 years until Darwin in the 1800s; systematized the science of logic to such an extent that (quoting historian of philosophy Anthony Kenny in Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition) "his work was subsumed, rather than superseded, by the developments of mathematical logic at the end of the nineteenth century by Frege and his contemporaries; developed a physical science that stood authoritative until the Renaissance, systematized philosophy itself with treatises on metaphysics, ethics, politics, psychology, aesthetics, philosophical procedures and methods. Aristotle's work (not like this stuff shouldn't be known to everyone by now) exists now only in not-always-accessible, quasi-lecture-note format; he is reputed to have written dialogues that outshone (as gold to silver) those of his master Plato. He was hailed almost unanimously among the medieval scholars who preserved and studied his work as the ultimate in human intelligence, the philosopher "par excellance," or simply The Philosopher according to the greatest of the medieval minds, Aquinas. (This despite having numerous erroneous views and often in areas of less specifically philosophical consequence - he didn't think his principles of the good life or eudaimonia applied to slaves or women; numerous of his scientific theories have been superseded or overturned.)
It is my view that an 'Aristotelian' approach to doing philosophy is the best one, or at the very least a suitably strong candidate for one. I place the likes of Aquinas, Ayn Rand, and Mortimer Adler within that tradition broadly speaking. When it comes to the "fruits" of whatever his method was, it includes a crucial piece of insight: that the human good, to be most fully or perfectly actualized, requires philosophical contemplation, and a perfecting of one's intellectual activity itself (whether as an aesthetic principle - living to kalon or for the sake of the noble, fine or beautiful - or for the sake of better living overall qua the kind of life-form one is). I characterize this as an intellectual perfectionism; Aristotle has been variously dubbed an "intellectualist" in his conception of (the fullest realization) of eudaimonia. The philosophic or contemplative life, and generally the progressive development or perfection of one's intellectual faculty, are in this sense a central and fundamental feature of the good life, the feature that more than any others would best explain all the other facets of a good human life (physical, emotional, social, spiritual, aesthetic,...). For the Aristotelian, eudaimonia is best or maximally achieved through the perfection of that 'best aspect within' our nature, our nous or intelligence, that a good human life is one led thoughtfully and intelligently, that this perfection of our rational natures is in some sense the same thing as living eudaimonically, as an activity of the rational soul. (Are living wisely and eudaimonically the same thing? Must one be a sage to be truly or fully eudaimonic?)
Now this distinctively Aristotelian (or more broadly, Greek) conception of the good life gives us a picture of the human good in terms of both the end and the means by which it is exercised (which are in some sense united and instantiated in rational activity, or: the human good is rational activity), which places it in interesting contrast to other ethical traditions which aren't so homed in on the rational element of our soul as the central defining potentiality to be actualized in a good human life. (This subsumes even the 'Kantian' rational-willing characteristic of distinctively moral cognition.) The Aristotelian ethical tradition is big on the concept of virtue (or excellence, arete in Greek): what makes for an excellent human being/life? Something something the utmost excellence of the rational or intellectual faculty. Now, the task of figuring out general principles for the best exercise of our rational faculty? That's for epistemology, the science of knowing as such. And if we exercise the proper epistemic discipline, the science of knowing becomes a unity with the science of living, with practical concerns. To live best is (inter alia) to know best, i.e., the latter is a precondition for the former. So what do the wiseguys, the made men, know exactly, anyway?
So something like philosophic activity itself is central to the Aristotelian conception of the good life. How much is that notion seared in the consciousness front and center when we consider alternative philosophical schools, whatever extant candidates we might look into for philosophic guidance?
As to such profoundly significant identifications being the fruit of a method, in Aristotle's case it has to do with something called dialectic, or the art of playing opinions against one another to hopefully yield a truth agreeable to all despite their remaining well-scrutinized differences. And even though Plato is noted for having made The Grand Original Contribution to the philosophical dialogue style via The Republic and other published works, it is dialectic as picked up and applied by Aristotle that may well yield the greatest fruit. Among other fruits of dialectical method would be what, in the final comparison, differentiated Plato from Aristotle: Aristotle adopted both Plato's 'rationalist' framework for thinking about philosophic questions (homing in on eternal, unchanging Forms or Ideas supposedly grasped by the intellect with the sense experience only providing at best a hint in Their direction), and a thoroughly empirical or experience-based one. Ideally the Aristotelian approach should be able to provide the very definitional or formal criteria for both living well and specifically philosophical activity, along with empirical examples of such in the real world. (Shouldn't philosophy be practical and not a lot of idle word-play?)
Dialectic has something to do with taking into account all the essential factors that come to bear on forming an opinion on anything, and ideally applies not just to analyzing and resolving differences of opinion but also in mapping our opinions onto the world itself. (It is a common sense or classical realist assumption that there is a real world out there independent of our knowing it and that our opinions can at least sometimes match up with or more systematically map onto what our senses provide us.) And in his inquiries into the nature of existence and our place in it, Aristotle covered a bunch of ground, really thoroughly/completely/wholly/perfectionist-like. I take him as an example to be emulated, each in our own way (we providing for the individuating features or manifestations of this formal principle of intellectual perfectionism), and perhaps not to be superseded or surpassed. If we propose to have a superior or more perfect alternative model of thinking/knowing/living on offer, then aren't we just re-affirming a principle of intellectual perfectionism, to the effect that we should adopt the most superior model on offer? So this becomes like an endpoint of the conversation about the norms of an ideal human society (also known as 'end of history' or perhaps 'utopia').
So as we progress through the stages of development we see that there is the potential for, if not actuality of, better living through philosophy, but then we see that there may be better ways of doing philosophy than others, in which case we should think in terms (eventually) of the best living through the best philosophy. And getting 'em as young as possible probably wouldn't hurt to speed up the 'end of history' collaborative project, as long as they learn all about things like the Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis and are not pumped full of philosophically-less-perfect material instead.
So this should give a taste of the gist of the 'better living through philosophy' Project that I've been consciously mulling these past 15 or so months, atop the previous context of thought already accumulated, and aided by some possibly-performance-enhancing substances. (Substance. ^_^ )
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